Title: Forget It

Abstract: In this paper I argue that we can be required to forget what we know. This is a surprising conclusion. Knowledge is the chief good of our epistemic lives, whereas forgetting is often negative, the process itself is often tinged with sadness. Forgetting, however, plays an indispensable role in our lives. Forgetting facilitates forgiveness. Forgetting protects privacy. As evidenced by the right to be forgotten becoming enshrined in European law, forgetting protects our future from the shadows of our past. Forgetting used to be commonplace, but now the internet never forgets. Understanding the duty to forget is central to answering the pressing ethical and epistemic challenges of our digital age. As surprising as it is that we can make demands that others forget what they know about us, I argue that we not only do, but also that we can. Further, although protecting moral goods such as forgiveness and privacy might seem to put us at odds with epistemic goods, I argue that we can take some of the sting out of this conflict by demonstrating that not only are we are epistemically permitted to forget, but also not every instance of forgetting is either irrational or unfortunate.