Abstract: Recently, some theorists have argued that most marginalized agents cannot act autonomously due to their marginal status and the environment in which they must act. One view that seems to lead us to this conclusion is an evaluative form of constitutivism. In this paper, however, I argue that we can keep this evaluative constitutive framework and still reach the conclusion that marginalized agents act autonomously. To do so, I argue that we must understand the unique deliberative standpoint of marginalized agents. This involves utilizing W.E.B. Du Bois’s notion of double consciousness. I expand upon this notion and argue that the presence of double consciousness often leads to double agency. Once we realize this, we can see the distinct layers of deliberation that take place and understand how double agents can act rationally and autonomously, even within the evaluative constitutivist framework. I conclude with a discussion of authenticity to show that the double agent exhibits a form of nonideal agency, through no fault of the agent. Rather the environment in which they reason in is to blame, as they must internalize a self-conception that is imposed upon them.